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    <title>crypto attacks — algoatson.github.io</title>
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    <description>The signing oracle reused a nonce across two messages. That&#x27;s the whole vulnerability — and it collapses the private key to a couple of modular divisions. The algebra, then the generalisation to merely *biased* nonces and a lattice.</description>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 02:47:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>the CBC padding oracle — decrypting without the key</title>
      <link>https://algoatson.github.io/p/cbc-padding-oracle/</link>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category>crypto</category><category>ctf</category>
      <description>A server that merely tells you whether a decrypted ciphertext had valid padding leaks the plaintext one byte at a time. No key, no brute force — just CBC&#x27;s structure and a single bit of feedback turned into full decryption.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>hash length extension — appending to a MAC you can&#x27;t compute</title>
      <link>https://algoatson.github.io/p/hash-length-extension/</link>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category>crypto</category><category>ctf</category>
      <description>H(secret ‖ message) looks like a MAC, but Merkle–Damgård hashes leak their internal state in the digest. Knowing that digest and the message length, you can resume the hash and append your own data — forging a valid tag for secret ‖ message ‖ padding ‖ anything, with the secret never in hand.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>a tour of RSA attacks</title>
      <link>https://algoatson.github.io/p/rsa-attacks-tour/</link>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category>crypto</category><category>ctf</category><category>math</category>
      <description>RSA is sturdy; the ways people deploy it are not. A field guide to the classic breaks — tiny exponents, shared moduli, small private keys, careless primes, partial leaks — each one a parameter choice that turns &quot;factor a 2048-bit number&quot; into a few lines of arithmetic.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>two signatures, one nonce: recovering an ECDSA key</title>
      <link>https://algoatson.github.io/p/ecdsa-nonce-reuse/</link>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category>crypto</category><category>ctf</category><category>math</category>
      <description>The signing oracle reused a nonce across two messages. That&#x27;s the whole vulnerability — and it collapses the private key to a couple of modular divisions. The algebra, then the generalisation to merely *biased* nonces and a lattice.</description>
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